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1. Introduction 
In philosophical debate about migration and the crossing of international borders 
discussion is generally focused either upon the interests and moral standing of migrants, 
or of those already-resident in the countries migrants wish to enter.2  Thus, regardless of 
whether one adopts a more liberal stance, such as that defended by Joseph Carens (1987; 
1992; 2013), Sarah Fine (2016) and Kieran Oberman (2016a) with regard to immigration 
and Michael Blake (Blake, 2016a; 2016b; 2017; Brock and Blake, 2015) with regard to 
emigration, or a less liberal one, defended with regard to immigration by David Miller 
(1995; 2005; 2016a, 2016b) and Christopher Wellman (2008; 2016; Wellman and Cole, 
2011) and, with respect to emigration, by Lea Ypi (2008) and Anna Stilz (2016), it is 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank the John Templeton Foundation (grant no. 60688) for its assistance 
in supporting the writing of this paper, to Guy Aitchison-Cornish, Adrian Blau, Robin 
Douglass, Carmen Pavel, Mark Pennington and to fellow participants at the Department 
of Political Economy’s Political Theory Seminar at King’s. 
2 This is in contrast to the empirical literature where those left behind have received 
considerable attention, notably in discussions of brain-drain in development economics. 
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commonly assumed that the moral subjects one ought to have in mind when weighing up 
the arguments are those directly impacted by migration.3  
 An important exception to these dominant standpoints has been the work of 
Gillian Brock (Brock, 2009a; 2009b; 2016a; 2016b; 2017; Brock and Blake, 2015) who 
makes a powerful case for qualified restrictions upon skilled emigration on the grounds 
of its brain-drain effects upon poorer migrant sending countries.4  This notwithstanding, 
and whilst Brock’s contribution represents a significant opening of the conceptual terrain, 
there is good reason to believe that it goes only part of the way to addressing the 
unintended disservice that the dominant standpoints do to all who may have a stake in 
that debate’s outcome.  It is for this reason that, whilst endorsing and indeed expanding 
upon Brock’s evaluative approach, I will argue that defenders of a more permissive 
stance can also incorporate the interests of those that migrants leave behind into their 
arguments.  Most importantly, and to further signal where my agreement with Brock will 
end, I will also show that this is something that defenders of open borders not only can 
                                                 
3 For an overview of the debate largely conducted from the migrant/already-resident 
perspective see Wellman, C. H. and Cole, P. (2011) and Fine, S. and Ypi, L. (2016).   For 
a rejection of the special obligations assumption that underlies the social justice argument 
see Abidazeh, A. (2016).  For a rejection of restrictions for those whose values are 
incompatible with liberal democracy see Carens, J. (2013, 176-7). 
4 See Brock, G. and Blake, M. (2015).  Brock’s co-author Michael Blake deploys a 
variety of ethical arguments against her position (Brock and Blake 2015, 156-78), and in 
defence of his own (Blake 2016a, 2016b, 2017) though from the migrant-centred 
standpoint.   
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but should do, for it provides a set of compelling reasons for her and other opponents of 
this stance such as Miller, Wellman, Ypi and Stilz to endorse it.   
 In addition to its different evaluative approach and normative stance, my 
argument will also be distinctive with respect to the philosophical perspective it employs 
to make its case.  In departing from the dominant migrant-centred standpoint assumed by 
a defenders of the liberal view such as Carens and Blake, and instead addressing the 
interests of those left behind, I will draw upon the epistemic tradition of liberalism 
associated with thinkers such as Hayek.5  More specifically, the epistemic approach will 
show that we have persuasive conceptual reasons to believe that the needs of those left 
behind are likely to be addressed by more open borders in ways which less open regimes 
cannot replicate. Central here will be the rôle that the immigrant remittance-sending that 
more open borders make possible plays in stimulating development in poorer states. 
 Importantly, the position that will be defended here is not only significant because 
of its new normative frame of reference.  Part of that defence also speaks in a direct way 
to the concern that liberals have in responding to arguments against migration in general 
and to immigration from poorer to wealthier countries in particular.  Whether it is 
because of the effects that the inflow of low- or unskilled migrants and their dependents 
from poorer countries have upon welfare budgets, upon the employment opportunities 
and wages of the already-resident, or because of concerns about community cohesion and 
                                                 
5 For a discussion of the epistemic liberal tradition and of Hayek’s place in it see Tebble 
(2016).   
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the erosion of liberal democratic values, such arguments are often compelling.6  Indeed, 
they are so compelling that it is now those who defend a liberal stance towards migration 
who often find themselves on the defensive. Whilst not wishing to dismiss concerns 
about culture, values and identity, in defending the liberal position my focus will be on 
the economic concerns that stimulate scepticism about immigration in destination 
countries.  More specifically, I will be concerned to advance a consequentialist argument 
about the medium- to long-term economic effect of emigration upon poorer countries that 
also addresses this scepticism in wealthier countries and the pressures to migrate that give 
rise to it.     
 Despite its presumption in favour of a more open stance, my argument will be 
qualified in several respects.  Firstly, and following Carens (2013, 237), I will not claim 
that the arguments one may advance in favour of more open borders always trump those 
one may advance against them of which, in addition to concerns about brain-drain, 
national security and cultural cohesion, social justice (Miller, 1995; 2004, 28-31) and 
public health are the most common.7  Rather, my concern will be to defend more open 
borders rather than fully open borders.  Second, and affinities with Carens’s normative 
stance notwithstanding, I will not limit my case for more open borders to wealthy 
                                                 
6 On the threat to liberal democratic values that immigration may present see Tebble 
(2006).  
7 For arguments for restrictions based on cultural and ecological concerns see Miller, D. 
(2005).  For a rejection of the special obligations assumption that underlies the social 
justice argument see Abidazeh (2016).  For a rejection of restrictions even for those 
whose values are incompatible with liberal democracy see Carens (2013, 176-7). 
5 
 
 
democratic states.  Unlike the presumption in The Ethics of Immigration, where ‘the 
control that democratic states exercise over immigration plays a crucial role in 
maintaining unjust global inequalities and in limiting human freedom unjustly’ (Carens 
2013, 230; 2013, 306-9, 315, n. 3), I will claim that more open borders are appropriate for 
all states, including poorer migrant-sending states.  Furthermore, I will not discuss the 
right of states, including states with more open borders, to determine whether immigrants 
should enjoy full rights of citizenship, or the grounds upon which they may terminate or 
attach conditions to their residence.8  Such questions are, of course, worthy of 
investigation in a more fully worked out epistemic liberal theory of justice in migration.  
Finally, and as has been suggested above, for two reasons my argument will be 
conceptual in nature rather than empirical.  The first reason for this is that defenders of 
more open borders are at a disadvantage with regard to empirical evidence precisely 
because the world in which we live, and from which they would need to draw their 
evidence, is one increasingly dominated by less open borders.  Any evidence to back up 
their claims is, therefore, likely to be conspicuous, if not by its absence, then by its 
relative paucity.  Moreover, and in any case, to the extent that there is evidence to attest 
to their effectiveness as poverty alleviators, the jury is still out as to whether remittances 
either cancel out or at least counterbalance the economic costs of brain-drain (Barry, 
2011: 32; Brock and Blake 2015: 43, 159; Brock 2016: 180; Blake: 2016; Oberman 
2016b: 106-7).  My argument, therefore, will be about what we can reasonably expect the 
                                                 
8 See Blake (2013), Anderson, B., Gibney, M. J. and Paoletti, E. (2011) and Lenard 
(2015). 
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likely effects of more open borders upon poorer migrant sending countries to be and will 
not make specific claims about particular cases.   
 Subsequent to giving an overview of the conceptual terrain of the debate about 
migration justice, in the section that follows I will draw upon the epistemic liberal 
literature to defend the claim that it is possible to include the interests of those left behind 
in the case for, and not just against, more open borders.  Central to this case will be the 
likely effects of the unique remittance-based mechanism of poverty alleviation that more 
open borders make possible.  In sections 3 and 4 I will further substantiate the epistemic 
case by responding to some objections.  The first of these is that the individualistic and 
discretionary mode of decision-making that remittance sending embodies means that they 
are unlikely to be a stable means of helping the global poor.  In section 4 I will invoke the 
epistemic liberal standpoint to respond to the further objection that remittances are likely 
to be insufficient to address the needs of the global poor, and that because they cannot be 
relied upon to allocate resources to those who need them most, they are likely to fail to 
adequately compensate for the brain-drain effects of skilled migration that the more open 
borders they require also make possible.  Before concluding I will consider, in section 5, 
the impact of our argument upon the question of obligations of justice to the world’s 
poor, including Kieran Oberman’s (2015) important defense of state based cross border 
cash payments.  Finally, and most significantly for this paper’s wider purposes, in this 
section I will also consider the standing of the dominant migrant/already-resident 
standpoint within which debate about migration justice is typically conducted and how, 
precisely because it is about how migrant push-factor conditions in poorer countries are 
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most likely to be improved, the argument made here may also address scepticism about 
immigration in wealthier receiving countries.   
 
2. Migration justice and the epistemic case for more open borders 
Migrants, the already-resident and migration justice 
The philosophical literature on migration offers a diversity of starting points from which 
to defend more open borders.  Carens (1987; 1992; 2009), for instance, has defended 
them on numerous grounds, including in terms of their consistency with Rawlsian, 
Nozickian and utilitarian consequentialist premises and, most recently, on the grounds of 
their consistency with democratic principles of equality of opportunity and liberty 
(2013).9  Moreover, and as Miller has clarified in Strangers in Our Midst (2016a), in 
addition to liberty and equality of opportunity arguments, open borders may also be 
defended on common (world) ownership and on human rights grounds, each of which he 
rejects in defending the democratic state’s right to control entry into its territory.10  This 
wide range of avenues to more open borders notwithstanding, it is not our purpose to 
                                                 
9 For a libertarian defence see Block, W. (1998).  Unlike a strict utilitarian approach, I do 
not assume that the beneficial consequences of more open borders are precisely 
quantifiable, either in terms of happiness, well-being, GDP or some other scale of value.  
Rather, I claim along with Bader (1997), Bauböck (2009) and Sangiovanni (2007) that 
they are beneficial in general terms.   
10 For a defence of open borders based upon economic benefits to the already-resident in 
migrant recipient countries see Powell, B. (2015).  For a humanitarian defence centred 
upon the moral standing of migrants see Kukathas, C. (2005).     
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offer either rebuttals of Miller’s criticisms or to reject directly his own more sceptical 
position.  Rather, it will be contended that in assuming migrant- and already-resident-
centred standpoints respectively, both sides of the migration debate are often unhelpfully 
narrow with respect to the range of subjects whose interests and moral standing are 
considered.  More specifically, they usually fail to include the interests of those that 
migrants leave behind - construed both as identifiable individuals such as family 
members (or those migrants leave behind) and as unknown fellow nationals (or those left 
behind by migration) - where they are permitted to cross international boundaries.11   
 An important exception to the migrant/already-resident justificatory standpoint is 
that of brain-drain critiques of skilled emigration where, as Miller (2005: 198), Wellman 
(2008: 128), Ypi (2008: 411) and Brock (Brock and Blake, 2015) have noted, a more 
open stance encourages the departure of the most talented and best educated from poorer 
countries to the detriment of their development.12  The brain-drain critique of skilled 
emigration is not only significant, however, because it shows how the interests of those 
left behind are relevant to debate about migration and justice.  Precisely because it is 
typically discussed as part of a critique of the normative stance defended here, it suggests 
that defenders of more open borders ought to be circumspect about expanding the range 
of moral subjects whose interests should feature in their arguments.  Much, therefore, 
rests upon the question of the likely poverty alleviating effects of more open borders 
versus the likely poverty-exacerbating effects of skilled emigration brain-drain, for if we 
                                                 
11 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer at Ethnicities for this perspicuous formulation 
of the distinction.  
12 See also Carens (2013: 183-4) and Oberman (2013) 
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have reason to think that the gains to be had by the former are cancelled out by the costs 
imposed by the latter then it follows that those left behind would be better off in a world 
of migration restrictions, supplemented with foreign direct investment and foreign aid.  
Thus, following authors such as Brock (Brock and Blake 2015: 43, 250-252; Brock 
2016a: 177) who is sure to point out that restrictions upon skilled emigration are only 
justified if brain-drain results in net losses for poorer countries, the case for defenders of 
more open borders to expand the range of subjects considered relevant to the debate 
about migration justice needs to show that even if skilled emigration brain-drain is one 
result of the liberal stance, there are other net gains that are likely to compensate for it.  
 
The epistemic case for more open borders 
How, then, could more open borders be of benefit not only to migrants but also to those 
migrants leave behind, thus reducing the likelihood of their needing to follow them?  
Despite her broad scepticism  of skilled migration Gillian Brock (Brock and Blake 2015: 
41-43; Brock 2016a: 178-9; 2017: 157) does acknowledge its positive effects upon those 
left behind, particularly as these relate to human capital formation, the benefits of links 
with diaspora communities and the financial and social capital brought back by 
returnees.13  The most important positive effect of all, however, is remittances (Barry 
2011: 31-32; Brock 2017: 157).  As has been widely noted, remittances represent a larger 
volume of cross-border resource transfer than foreign direct investment and foreign aid 
combined, a fact that is doubly impressive given that this occurs in a world of relatively 
                                                 
13 See also Barry (2011: 37), Blake (Brock and Blake, 2015; 162-5) and Rapoport (2016: 
128-9). 
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closed borders.14  Indeed, the most recent figure amounts to approximately what would 
be transferred were the United Nations to pass a resolution mandating that each year all 
the residents of Austria direct the entirety of their productive efforts to poverty alleviation 
in the developing world.   
 Impressive as these figures are, however, we should not be rushed by them into 
endorsing more open borders.  First, what matters is the effect of remittances upon 
development and as Brock (Brock and Blake 2015: 43; Brock 2016a: 180), Blake (Brock 
and Blake 2015: 159; Blake 2016b) and Oberman (2016b; 106-7) point out, we should 
not expect political theorists to be able to gauge this with much success.  This, of course, 
presents a potentially significant objection, because it implies that the serious justificatory 
work for remittances and more open borders may have to be done by other, social 
scientific rather than philosophical, fields of enquiry such as development economics.  
Yet, such a response would be as unwarranted as it is unhelpfully compartmentalised in 
its conception of the division of labour between conceptual and empirical enquiry.  First, 
turning to social science may be of little help, for as Christian Barry (2011), Brock 
(Brock and Blake, 2015: 110, 160) and Oberman (2015: 241-2) also readily concede, the 
ever-changing empirical data on the effects of remittances appear to buttress arguments 
on both sides of the debate.  Moreover, Brock (Brock and Blake 2015: 43) also concedes 
that the same indeterminacy is manifested in the empirical literature on brain-drain, 
                                                 
14 Remittances to low- and middle-income countries (US$): 2014 435.4bn, 2015 431.5bn, 
2016 421.9bn, 2017 442bn, 2018 529bn, 2019 550bn (projection). World Bank Group 
(2019: vii).    
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where effects vary ‘considerably for different countries of origin, especially given 
population size, skill levels within those populations, and so forth.’ 
Secondly, and these ambiguities notwithstanding, we can in any case make 
persuasive conceptual claims as political philosophers about the likely consequences of 
more open borders that do important work in the debate.  More specifically, and provided 
we have plausible theoretical foundations, we can offer a set of principles that will 
indicate what the empirical data are likely to show and to which empirical social science 
may thereafter turn its attention.  That is, in the case of debate about migration justice we 
can offer what Friedrich Hayek (1967) called a philosophically defensible ‘pattern 
prediction’ with respect to the likely economic effects of more open borders upon the 
global poor.  This, of course, is precisely what Brock has done in her own 
consequentialist assessment of the likely effects of skilled migration where, as we have 
seen she concedes that the rate of resource transfer via remittances is impressively high.  
In a similar vein, however, she does remain unconvinced of the overall case for them.  
‘[R]emittances’, Brock (2017: 157) claims,  
 
can lead to government underinvestment in beneficial development, exacerbate 
existing inequalities, create dependence, and, unless well managed, do not 
necessarily contribute to funding important public goods such as healthcare and 
education, or address underlying structural causes of poverty.  Remittances also 
tend to decline over time and fuel further migration as citizens become more 
aware of wage differentials.15 
                                                 
15 See also her comments in Brock and Blake, 2015: 44-5.   
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The instability objection to remittances and more open borders  
Such objections about likely effects, moreover, are not the only ones that may be raised 
against the case for more open borders for those left behind.  One particularly important 
one which we will address first is discussed by Hein de Haas (2007: 4-5) in his account 
of the development of the debate about migration and remittances.  Particularising an 
important aspect of Marxian critique of markets to the particular case of remittances, the 
concern here is that remittances are subject to the whims and caprices of senders and to 
the anarchic vicissitudes of markets, they are an unavoidably unstable means of assisting 
those left behind, not least when compared to foreign aid.16  In order to avoid these 
problems the demands of justice therefore require that states maintain migration controls 
and that the richer among them discharge their obligations to the world’s poor instead 
either via foreign aid, foreign direct investment or state-based cash transfers of the kind 
defended by Oberman, or some combination of these.  
It is in this connection, moreover, where our epistemic liberal standpoint makes 
its first significant contribution to the debate about migration justice, for in building upon 
the work of authors such as Barry (2011: 33) it provides two reasons to reject the 
                                                 
16 On the Marxian critique of market anarchy see Marx, K., Capital: A Critical Analysis 
of Capitalist Production, Moscow, Progress/London, Lawrence and Wishart, (1867, 
1885, 1894), 1974, vol. I, pp. 336-7, 449, 457, 472, vol. II, pp. 176, 318-319, 473, vol. 
III, pp. 260, 881; Engels, F., ‘Socialism: utopian and scientific’, in L. S. Feuer (ed.) Marx 
and Engels: basic writings on politics and philosophy, Garden City, Doubleday, 1959, 
pp. 57-8.   
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instability objection and claim instead that remittances ‘are more stable than foreign 
investment or aid flows to the developing world’.  The first reason for this pertains to the 
erroneous terms of evaluation that the market anarchy or instability objection 
presupposes and which the epistemic standpoint clarifies.  I have discussed elsewhere the 
philosophical commitments underlying epistemic liberal views on the nature of 
knowledge and the impact this has upon questions of resource use and distributive 
justice.17  Suffice it to say that for exponents of this tradition the important fact about the  
knowledge of the circumstances that must be  taken into account when deciding questions 
of resource use, including questions pertinent to the transfer of resources across borders, 
is that for a variety of reasons it is uncentralisable.18  First, it is knowledge  that is 
dependent upon the subjective valuations of individual agents. For example, what for one 
agent would be a worthless plot of land because it is blighted by a sticky black substance 
that makes agriculture impossible, is for another an extremely valuable source of oil.  
Moreover, and because agents are for the most part not in direct contact with one another, 
this subjectively-held knowledge is never given to any particular agent in its entirety but 
is only ever dispersed among them.  Third, as preference-shaping but culturally 
embedded knowledge, the knowledge relevant to adequate decision making about 
resource use is often tacit in form, with the consequence that agents whose own decisions 
                                                 
17 See Tebble, A. J., Epistemic liberalism: a defence, London, Routledge, 2015, pp.28-33. 
18 By knowledge of the circumstances it is meant knowledge of what counts as a good or 
a resource, of how valuable either is relative to other valued goods and resources and of 
which factors of production and combinations thereof should be utilised in producing and 
distributing them. 
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about resource use would be different were they to have access to it have no means of 
taking it into account until it is acted upon by those who possesses it.  Finally, this 
knowledge of the circumstances to which agents must refer in order to execute their plans 
successfully is, for two reasons, subject to continual change.  In the first instance this is 
because of exogenous factors, such as changes in climatic conditions or the occurrence of 
natural disasters that impact upon the preferences we may have, and of the availability of 
resources to satisfy them.  Second, and as complex adaptive systems theory helpfully 
clarifies, the knowledge of the circumstances of which agents must make continual use 
constantly changes precisely because of the impact of the prior decisions of others.19  For 
example, when an unforeseen rush on a desired good or resource occurs, agents must 
adjust their consumption plans with respect to it.  ‘To put it briefly,’ claims Hayek (1948: 
78), ‘it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its 
totality’, but which is nonetheless relevant to agents’ decisions leading to the fruition of 
their plans.  Crucially, and to attest to the what we may call the meta-ethical character of 
this insight, plans are unavoidably impacted in this way regardless of whether they are 
those of self- or other-interested individuals or associations of either.  There exists for 
epistemic liberals, therefore, no special vantage point from which the seamless and 
instantaneous coordination of efforts regarding resource use could be realised, either on 
the part of mutually-distant agents acting alone or in concert, or of an agent of the state 
seeking from the centre to direct cooperative efforts.   
Crucially, the absence of this epistemic vantage point explains why all systems of 
resource allocation would be necessarily unstable relative to an ideal state where 
                                                 
19 On complexity see Axelrod, R. and Cohen, M. D. (2000).   
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coordination is fortuitously instantaneous.  Because resolving the knowledge problem at a 
stroke is impossible, the only alternative is to adjust, sometimes unevenly and 
haphazardly, to new and unforeseen conditions as we learn of them.  To object to more 
open borders on the grounds of the instability of remittances, therefore, is not only to 
misunderstand the ultimately beneficial rôle that fluctuations play in the process of 
adjustment to ever-changing complex conditions.  It is to assume, falsely, that there is 
some alternative method of resource transfer that is not susceptible to such changes and is 
therefore perfectly stable regardless of underlying conditions.  Indeed, if our only option 
were institutions that did not permit such allegedly anarchic fluctuations, we would have 
serious cause for concern.  The appropriate conceptual question, therefore, is not whether 
the economic case for more open borders for those left behind is damaged by the 
instability of remittances, but whether remittances are more or less stable than a regime 
of more closed borders that relied far more upon cash transfers, foreign investment, 
foreign aid, or some combination of these.   
 In addition to setting the appropriate terms of evaluation, the epistemic standpoint 
enables us to reconsider what is meant by stability with respect to resource transfer and it 
is here where it provides instructive a second reason for rejecting the instability objection.  
There are at least two readings of stability that one may adopt.  First, we may understand 
stability in terms of what donors provide.  To send the same amount of resource across 
borders over time would, on this reading, satisfy the requirements of stability.  However, 
there is another more appropriate reading of stability that the instability objection 
obscures.  Here, and in keeping both with our focus on those left behind and with the 
unavoidably cyclical nature of the economic process to which epistemic liberals draw our 
16 
 
 
attention, stability properly understood is only ever relative to the in situ conditions faced 
by recipients.  On this reading, it matters more that the amount those left behind receive 
is stable relative to changes in their circumstances than whether the amount sent remains 
unchanged.  Importantly, it is this more nuanced, context-sensitive, understanding of 
stability that provides reason to question whether stability of donation is always a good 
thing as those who advance the instability objection would have us believe.  Indeed, the 
ever-changing nature of the circumstances to which those left behind must respond 
suggests that it is context-sensitivity and flexibility on the part of senders that is required 
if one is to satisfy the demands of stability.   
 
3. Discretion, moral motivation and the stability of remittances 
Whilst these more appropriate terms of evaluation and more nuanced understanding of 
stability allow us to offer a powerful explanation of the benefits that remittances bring, 
they do not of themselves provide us with an argument for more open borders.  After all, 
one may object, if remittances are so important why not metaphorically instruct all the 
residents of Austria to send money as our earlier example suggested, or else follow 
Oberman and institute a system of state-based cash payments, thus obviating the need for 
immigrants and the more open borders they require?  There is, it seems, no necessary 
connection between remittances and migration.   
 Leaving our discussion of Oberman’s proposal to section 5, it is in response to 
this objection that we may explain why the benefits of remittances arise only when they 
are sent by migrants and, therefore, when we have a more rather than less open borders 
regime.  Explaining this relies in the first instance upon two important distinctions, the 
17 
 
 
first of which pertains to the mode of resource transfer, whilst the second takes interest in 
the moral motivations that drive it.  With regard to the first we can conceive of a mode of 
transfer being individualistic and discretionary (such as foreign direct investment or 
remittances) or collective (such as foreign aid) whilst, with regard to the second, we can 
conceive of the moral motivations that inform it as being either self-interested or 
affective.  With these two distinctions in mind we can see how foreign investment is 
likely to be susceptible to fluctuation relative to the needs of those left behind precisely 
because it is not only an individualistic, discretionary and therefore flexible mode of 
cross-border resource transfer, but one whose primary motivation is profit.  It is because 
of this underlying motivation, of course, that foreign investment can be erratic with 
respect to the amounts of money invested.  The phenomenon of capital flight is an 
illuminating example of this - although the fact that capital shifts from one part of the 
world to another for reasons of profit may be as much explained by the unpredictable 
and/or predatory behaviour of host governments as it is by the self-interested 
capriciousness of transnational corporations.   
 Would immigrant remittances be likely to be subject to their own, non-corporate, 
version of capital flight?  Despite also being individualistic and discretionary, immigrant 
remittances are not motivated by profit but by sentiment and affection, insofar as they 
represent flows of money from senders to those whose fortunes they care about in poorer 
countries.  Thus, despite sharing the same individualistic mode of resource transfer with 
foreign direct investment, the fellow-feeling towards others that motivates the sending of 
immigrant remittances makes them considerably more reliable than the former, even 
during straitened economic circumstances.  Indeed if they are unstable this is because 
18 
 
 
immigrant remittances are susceptible to changes in government policy, where a 
tightening of immigration rules or changes in tax law increase the chances of a reduction 
in resource flow, rather than because of the affective motivational logic that drives 
them.20  To be sure, this is not to claim that remittances should replace foreign direct 
investment.  As we will see in Section 5, for the latter may reach parts of the economy of 
a poorer country that remittances cannot and regardless of whether borders are more or 
less open.  Rather, their relative stability makes immigrant remittances, and the more 
rather than less open borders they require, a uniquely beneficial supplement to it.   
 Despite being premised on a different, collective, mode of decision-making, we 
may concur with the view that similar affective sentiments motivate the provision of 
foreign aid.  Yet, we should be sceptical of the stability of foreign aid with regard to the 
in situ needs of those left behind, although not because it fluctuates either in line with 
changes in wider economic and political circumstances that force the budgetary hand of 
politicians, or because of its susceptibility to use by governments as a tool for the 
projection of soft power or, more brazenly, as direct leverage over policy formation in 
recipient states (Oberman, 2015: 247; Hirschman and Bird, 1971).  Whilst each of these 
                                                 
20 It should also be noted, in contrast to Brock’s (2017: 157; Brock and Blake 2015: 45) 
view that remittances have a tendency to decline over time, the cumulative nature of 
remittances - secured not just by the most recent waves of immigrants but also by their 
descendants - means that they are not directly susceptible to contractions in political 
hospitality on the part of host societies.  Even a sudden restriction of immigration would 
not immediately issue in a decline in remittances.   
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would impact upon provision, they do so only over the medium to long-term, precisely 
because the wheels of politics and governmental policy formation turn relatively slowly.   
To obtain a more persuasive explanation of the relative instability of foreign aid 
and of why remittances are therefore likely to offer a uniquely beneficial means of 
supplementing it, we need to return to the question of its motivational logic, for it not a 
mode of provision that is based on affection alone.  More specifically, it involves not just 
the well-intentioned disbursement of funds from richer countries, but their passage 
through official channels in recipient countries which are at risk of corruption.  In 
contrast, then, to what can be called the fully affectionate character of remittances, 
foreign aid is less stable relative to the needs of recipients because it occupies a place 
midway between immigrant remittances and foreign investment.  In contrast to the 
former which avoid what Oberman (2015, 248) calls ‘middlemen’, the extent to which 
foreign aid flows through official channels is the extent to which it is susceptible to the 
unscrupulous machinations and self-interested predatory behaviour of office holders.  As 
Barry (2011; 35) succinctly puts it, ‘[a]id strengthens the state of the receiving country 
relative to its citizens, whereas remittances do the opposite’. 
 
More open borders and epistemic bonds 
Of course, one could still doubt that, even if it shows how the individualistic and 
affective nature of immigrant remittances reveals them to be more stable than foreign aid 
and foreign direct investment, we are therefore committed to more open borders.  As we 
saw at the beginning of this section, if we want the discretionary flexibility and affective 
motivation of remittances we could simply direct all the residents of Austria to devote 
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their productive efforts towards the relief of global poverty.  Like foreign aid, such an 
arrangement would represent an affective mode of transfer but would be coupled with the 
flexibility of the individualistic and discretionary decision-making of foreign direct 
investment.   
 Yet, it is here where epistemic liberalism’s contribution becomes apparent in 
another sense, for it turns out that the individualistic mode and affective motivations 
underpinning immigrant remittances are necessary but not sufficient factors for a full 
explanation of why the findings of development economists are likely to confirm their 
unique benefits.  It is because of the bonds of epistemic familiarity that persist between 
immigrants and those they leave behind that enables immigrant remittances to helpfully 
vary according to the ever-changing in situ needs of recipients, thus maintaining stability 
relative to those needs over time in ways that foreign aid under a more closed borders 
regime cannot.  Immigrants, that is, already know, or can without great cost come to 
know, what the needs of those left behind are precisely because they know who they 
are.21  By contrast, and no matter how motivated by ethical concerns all the residents of 
Austria would be, or how much discretion they may enjoy, the persistent bonds of 
familiarity required for resource transfer stability to those left behind under ever-
changing conditions would be few and far between and quite possibly non-existent.  
                                                 
21 Indeed, Vargas-Silva and Ruiz (2008) suggest that remittances are so flexible as to be 
countercyclical.  That is, precisely because of their affective motivations and the 
discretion that they enjoy with regard to decision-making, migrants send more when there 
is a downturn in their home countries.  See also Barry (2011: 35-6) who highlights how 
close bonds ensure that remittances are spent properly. 
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Assistance provided at arm’s length by all the residents of Austria may, even in a world 
that tolerated strict controls upon migration, be imbued with the best of intentions.  But it 
is doubtful that it would be put to as effective use as it would in a world with fewer such 
controls.22   
 Our argument about epistemic constraints upon resource use, coupled with our 
insights into the moral motivations, mode of transfer and epistemic familiarity underlying 
different methods of assistance thus explain why ‘[immigrant] remittances are one of the 
less volatile sources of foreign exchange earnings for developing countries’ (Ratha, 
Mohapatra and Xu 2008, 12).  The problem for foreign direct investment with regard to 
poverty alleviation, then, is that it represents an effective mode of resource transfer but 
with an inappropriate motivational logic for the purposes of stability, whilst foreign aid 
and non-immigrant remittances represent the reverse: an appropriately structured 
motivational logic but with an ineffective mode of transfer.  To be sure, none of this is to 
suggest that we should do away with foreign direct investment and foreign aid, despite 
their relative shortcomings.  Rather, it is to make the more modest claim that these 
shortcomings would go unaddressed under a less open borders regime to the extent that 
this would stifle the epistemic benefits of bonds of familiarity across borders.  Precisely 
because they are unique to it, the epistemic gains to be had from immigrant remittances 
                                                 
22 Similarly, and because of the slow turning wheels of politics and the epistemic distance 
between decision-makers and those they seek to assist, foreign aid is predictably less 
flexible relative to evolving needs, despite its similar affective and other-regarding 
motivations.   
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are only possible in a more rather than less open borders regime, regardless of what we 
expect with regard to foreign direct investment and foreign aid.   
 
4. Sufficiency, the misallocation objection and state signalling 
Does our rejection of the instability objection clinch the argument for more open borders 
as a means of addressing global poverty and with it the migratory pressures that lead to 
anti-immigration sentiment in receiving countries?  Perhaps not, for one could claim that, 
regardless of how large or stable they are, immigrant remittances will be insufficient for 
the purposes of poverty alleviation.  This objection is an important one, for to the extent 
that remittances are insufficient the force of our case is accordingly diminished, 
especially given that alternatives such as foreign aid and foreign direct investment do not 
have to rely upon borders being open, or at least as open.   
 Importantly, however, the insufficiency objection fails because, as suggested 
above, it misconstrues the epistemic argument for more open borders as an epistemic 
argument against foreign aid and foreign direct investment.  Our political choice 
regarding these different means of addressing global poverty is not a zero sum one 
between mutually incompatible options.  Rather, it is an argument about the rôle liberty 
of movement should play in our efforts to improve the situation of those left behind, 
insofar as it may be combined with and enhance other means of poverty alleviation that 
over the long-term, reduce the pressure to migrate.  Indeed, as Barry (2011: 33) points 
out, because they are dependent upon the degree to which migration is permitted in a way 
in which aid and investment are not, remittances are supplementary to these alternatives 
and as such complimentary to rather than competitive with them.  
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It is here, moreover, where our epistemic standpoint clarifies an additional 
advantage of more open borders with respect to the transformation of the conditions and 
push-factors that lead to migratory pressure with which migration sceptics are concerned. 
Here the central idea is that there is a symbiotic relationship between migratory flows in 
one direction and immigrant remittance flows in the other that constitutes a vital 
signalling mechanism for agents of the state as they seek to augment their ex situ 
knowledge of poverty with the in situ knowledge of migrants and those they leave 
behind.  By taking advantage of this state signalling mechanism agents of both poorer 
and wealthier states may combine data on migration and remittance flows with big data 
and predictive analytic techniques such as geospatial predictive modelling to bridge the 
epistemic gap between themselves and those they seek to assist.23  As the case of the 
Mexico-United States border shows, the discrete movements of migrants across borders 
and the subsequent flow of remittances in the other direction combine to act as a 
signalling mechanism that gives a clearer idea of local needs and of what, therefore, 
would count under ever-changing conditions as a sufficient response to them.24  
Importantly, these epistemic developmental gains that reduce pressure to migrate over the 
longer-term are only had to the extent that we have a more rather than less permissive 
                                                 
23 For a non-technical introduction see Finlay (2014).   
24 According to figures from the United Nations Development Program report for 2004, 
for example, of the 32 Mexican states the highest recipients of remittances were 
Zacatecas and Michoacán which respectively occupy places 25 and 28 on that country’s 
human development index. UNDP Report 2004, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-
development-report-2004 
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migratory regime. The extent to which frontiers are closed will be the extent to which 
states, richer and poorer alike, cannot avail themselves of this in situ knowledge as they 
respectively implement foreign aid and national development programmes.  Rather, then, 
than deciding what a sufficient overall amount of resource-transfer from richer to poorer 
nations is themselves in a more closed borders regime, and in doing so run the risk of 
over providing or under providing relative to the needs of recipients, both poorer and 
wealthier states are more likely to make better decisions about national development  and 
foreign aid respectively when guided by the patterns of behaviour of those most familiar 
with the circumstances of poverty which they seek to ameliorate.25   
 
This misallocation objection to more open borders 
Of course, we do not just want to have a means of ascertaining what a sufficient level of 
of resources for those left behind would be, but also of how these would be most 
efficaciously employed.  It is here where another objection to more open borders, based 
not upon the instability or insufficiency of remittances but upon their alleged allocational 
inefficiency, has been advanced to differing degrees of specificity in the literature. Again, 
these objections are worth considering at length insofar as they impact upon our broader 
claim about remittances stimulating the development required to lower migratory 
pressures upon wealthier states over the long-term.   
At the most general level it may be suggested that immigrant remittances follow 
the same unfortunate logic as their free market cousin, foreign direct investment, where 
                                                 
25 For example, in deciding how to implement development strategies such as three-for-
one matching programmes (Brock and Blake, 2015: 56, n. 23). 
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precisely because the economic, political and legal environment is often less certain 
resources do not go to the countries that need them most.  Tellingly, this unhappy result 
of the exercise of economic liberty is not hostage to the empirical data that confirms it.26   
Rather, it is a theoretically predictable consequence of the profit-driven rather than 
affective nature of markets, where foreign direct investment will only seek out those 
environments that promise the healthiest return. Of course, one may respond that the 
objection is more telling against those who advance the case for less rather than more 
open borders.  The more that borders are open, after all, the more likely it is that there 
will be immigrants from a wider variety of countries sending money home.  Yet, even if 
this is granted, and again because of the individualistic and discretionary nature of 
immigrant remittances, there is no guarantee that they will be allocated appropriately, for 
example on a regional level within recipient countries, even if they are sent to the right 
countries.   
 Taking this objection to a greater degree of specificity, it has been claimed that 
there is also no guarantee that those individuals who need remittances most will receive 
them.  As a range of authors (Higgins 2008, 529-30; Carens 2013, 233; Oberman 2015, 
241) have pointed out, remittances do not take into consideration the problem of effective 
demand, where a minimum of resources is required to migrate in the first place so that 
                                                 
26 Of the top 20 countries in cumulative receipt of foreign investment to the end of 2014 
none were from the developing world whilst only four - China, Brazil, India and Mexico 
- were newly-industrialised countries.  Indeed, of the top 10 recipients all but China were 
advanced industrialised economies.  See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2198rank.html  
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remittances may flow back to those left behind.  Given that the world’s very poorest 
cannot afford to cross borders, it follows that more open borders would only be of benefit 
to those who are relatively well-off in poorer countries (Pogge 1997, 14; Brock 2009a, 
205).  Finally, there is no guarantee that, even if they were sent to the right people, 
immigrant remittances would be well spent.  Brock (2009a, 206) adopts this line of 
argument when claiming that the vast bulk of remittances are spent on day-to-day living 
and consumer items rather than on investments that may stimulate economic 
development.  Even, then, if it is unreasonable to deny that spending on consumer items 
at least benefits local market traders, this is to ignore the more important developmental 
gains to be had from longer-term and more transformative forms of investment, such as 
those to be had with respect to major infrastructure.   
 Similarly, to the underlying logic of the stability and sufficiency objections, 
however, what may be called the misallocation objection in its various guises is also 
premised upon the existence of an ideal standard against which immigrant remittances 
may be held to fall short and that appears impervious to the problem of the 
uncentralisability of the in situ knowledge relevant to poverty alleviation.  Given the 
strong epistemic reasons for believing that it is not evident what such an allocation would 
be, given that the in situ knowledge of the circumstances is not given in any conveniently 
accessible way, it follows that our judgment about the susceptibility of immigrant 
remittances to the allocation objection in its various guises must in the first instance be a 
relative one between it and other modes of cross border allocation.  The important 
question, therefore, is not whether one should reject more open borders because of the 
allocational imperfections of immigrant remittances that, relative to an ideal, fail to make 
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up for the costs of brain-drain.  It is whether they would do better than the allocation 
emergent from a less open borders regime that relied more upon foreign direct investment 
and foreign aid.   
 Having already questioned the stability and sufficiency of foreign direct 
investment on the grounds of its profit-oriented rather than affective motivational logic 
and individualistic mode of operation, it stands to reason that it would be equally 
ineffective as a mechanism for the direct allocation of resources to the world’s poor.  By 
contrast, it would be reasonable to think that even under a less open borders regime 
foreign aid would not be susceptible to misallocation.  Precisely because it is both an 
affective and collective decision-making procedure, foreign aid could be carefully 
targeted and this, coupled with the fact that less open borders would mean less brain-
drain, ought to show that the advantage lies not with proponents of more open borders, 
but with those who are sceptical of them.  Yet, as was the case with the questions of 
stability and sufficiency, we should doubt the persuasiveness of this argument, especially 
when the epistemic distance inherent in centralised poverty alleviation mechanisms such 
as foreign aid or ‘three for one’ (Brock and Blake, 2015: 56 n. 23) remittance matching 
programs deployed by migrant source countries are considered.  First, as a resource 
transfer mechanism whose decision-makers are distant from the conditions faced by those 
they seek to help, these would allow for a relatively minimal degree of in situ decision-
making about resource allocation.  The consequence of this is that knowledge of the 
circumstances necessary for deciding questions of allocation would be radically 
underused relative to that exploited by remittance-sending immigrants under a more open 
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borders regime.  Furthermore, and in addition to its epistemic drawbacks, the allocational 
efficacy of foreign aid is likely to be undermined by the distorting effects of corruption.27   
 The problems for foreign aid in a world of less open borders do not end here.  If 
one assumes along with Higgins (2008) the existence of gendered, racialised and class-
based structures and processes of favouritism and discrimination in poorer countries, then 
it stands to reason that these would also be operative at the point of disbursement of 
foreign aid in a manner that may be at variance with what the state signalling mechanism 
of migration and remittance flows would suggest ought to be the case.  Indeed, it is here 
where our two counter-arguments to the allocation objection coalesce.  Because of the 
existence of structural processes of discrimination in the public sphere of poorer 
countries, the more open borders approach is to be seen at its most virtuous precisely 
because it affords a means of avoiding both well-intentioned but disconnected decision-
makers in donor countries and political middle men in recipient countries who, 
presumably, are selected from the more privileged strata of society.  Oberman (2015, 
248) also acknowledges the pitfalls of foreign aid but, mindful of what he claims are the 
rights-violating deficiencies of remittances, opts instead for a regime of state-based cash 
transfer.  These, he claims ‘bypass middlemen, allowing the poor to decide how resources 
are spent,’ a point to which we will return presently.    
                                                 
27 According to Transparency International Suharto’s regime in Indonesia embezzled up 
to $35bn, whilst Mobutu Sese Seko of the former Zaïre is said to have plundered up to 
$6bn of public money, much of it development aid.  On this see Global Corruption 
Report 2004, London, Pluto Press, 2004, p. 13.  
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 By contrast, a more open borders regime enables those left behind to respond 
directly to their circumstances, or to follow what Oberman (2015, 247) has called in situ 
ways of addressing desperate poverty.  Such a regime, that is, is uniquely placed to 
harness not only the discretionary decision-making and affective sentiments of 
immigrants but also their first-hand knowledge of the places they leave behind so that 
remittances are allocated in a manner consistent with the ever-changing exigencies of 
underlying local conditions as communicated to them by those left behind.  By contrast, 
in a less open borders regime decision-makers concerned with the plight of the global 
poor must make the vast majority of their judgments based upon ex situ knowledge.  For 
this reason, and contrary to the misallocation critique, it is foreign aid under a more 
closed borders regime that stands to be considered a relatively epistemically blunt and 
context insensitive instrument with respect to the allocation of resources to the global 
poor under ever-changing complex conditions.  Of course, this does not mean that more 
open borders would provide perfect signalling, as the case of Mexico also makes clear.28  
Nevertheless, there are strong reasons - rooted in the context sensitivity of their 
individualistic and affective mode of operation - to suppose that remittances are likely to 
do so better than foreign aid with less open borders.29   
                                                 
28 See footnote 24 above.  
29 Peer-to-peer payment systems such as blockchain based remittances cut out corporate 
middlemen such as banks and remittance agencies.  Liberty, therefore, is not to be read 
only in contradistinction to state centralisation.  It also opens the way for the realisation 
of different forms of private economic relationship.  
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 We can invoke the benefits of more open borders to respond to the other versions 
of the misallocation objection.  Thus, whilst we may concede that immigrant remittances 
enter poor countries in the imperfect way that Pogge and Higgins suggest, this objection 
nonetheless fails to consider their indirect consequences insofar as they act as stimuli for 
broader economic development.  Similarly, to the effects of foreign direct investment, the 
remittance buck very rarely, if ever, stops with the family of the immigrant who sends 
them and, as Oberman (2015, 242) succinctly claims, ‘people can benefit from 
remittances even if they do not receive them’.  Rather, as Barry (2011: 33) points out, 
remittances become significant although unintended stimuli for local development that 
induce simulative ripple effects beyond.  Here increased demand leads not only to more 
hiring opportunities for employers in the retail sector, but also for those further up the 
supply chain.  It may be the case, therefore, that a large proportion of remittances are 
spent out of the self-interested motivations of those who receive them, but in this way 
they are also likely to be of benefit to known and unknown others who provide the goods 
and services they are now in a position to acquire.  So, even if they do not fill the gaps 
left in the economy by skilled emigrants on a one-to-one basis, the fact that remittances 
are likely to fill other gaps means that the claim that more open borders will issue in net 
losses for those left behind is to be greeted with scepticism. 
 What of Brock’s concern that immigrant remittances are only spent on day-to-day 
items?  Prima facie this may be the most powerful objection, precisely because of their 
affective nature.  Yet, we should pause before accepting it, not least because the 
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empirical evidence suggests that it is untrue.30  Similarly to the claim that those who need 
them most will not receive them, even if it were true that remittances are spent largely on 
day-to-day items, or even on status-based conspicuous consumption, this omits not only 
the indirect benefits and positive economic ripple effects of remittance-based 
consumption. As supplementary income that otherwise would not have existed without 
emigration, remittances free up the funds that those left behind would have had to rely 
upon for day-to-day expenses for other longer-term investments in health, education and 
the like (Barry, 2011: 33).  
 
Misallocation, state signalling and the net effects of brain-drain 
Considerations of stability, sufficiency, allocation and state signalling have important 
implications for how we assess the force of the brain-drain objection to skilled migration 
raised by authors such as Brock.  We will recall that in advancing her case for qualified 
emigration restrictions, Brock (Brock and Blake, 2015) accepts that our judgment will be 
dependent upon a calculation of the net effects of remittances and skilled migration brain-
drain.   
The first problem here is that because Brock (Brock and Blake, 2015: 42-5) subtly 
misrepresents the terms of evaluation of the case for more open borders by considering 
                                                 
30 According to the World Bank, for example, remittances to Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia were spent on the following items: food and clothing 31%, education 14%, home 
repair 13%, savings 12%, property purchase 7%, medical expenses 6%, business 
investment 4%, special events 4%, other expenses/contingency 4%, car purchases 3%, 
land purchase 1.5%, charity 0.5%.  Source: www.bbc.co.uk, 16/01/2007.  
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only the remittances of skilled migrants.  Skilled immigrant remittances, we will recall, 
are not all that would be permitted by more open borders.  Rather, and beyond the other 
effects that we have seen she already concedes, she would need to consider the benefit of 
emigrant remittances in the round versus the brain-drain cost of skilled emigration.  
 Second, any adequate assessment of net effects would also have to incorporate the 
unique benefit of state signalling emergent from more open borders for the purposes of 
foreign aid and national development - and in particular the state signalling emergent 
from the movement and spending patterns of unskilled emigrants who, unlike their 
skilled compatriots, are more likely to come from the poorer strata of poorer societies 
where development needs are most acute.  Likely gains through state signalling, however, 
are absent from Brock’s net effects argument.  Yet, once both factors are conceded we 
have conceptual reason to claim that Brock’s argument that more open borders would 
result in a net loss to sending societies is at best open to question and at worst doubtful. 
Indeed, acting upon the brain-drain critique to restrict migration from poorer to wealthier 
countries is likely to end up being counter-productive from the standpoint both of those in 
poorer states who desire faster rates of development and of those in wealthier states who 
desire lower levels of immigration over the long term.  By its very nature a less open 
borders regime would thwart the very process by which poorer countries decisions about 
national development and those of wealthier nations about foreign aid could be 
responsive to the ever-changing in situ circumstances, thus stimulating quicker rather 
than slower development which over the longer term will reduce the pressure to migrate.   
 
5. More open borders, state signalling and obligations of justice 
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Thus far I have defended more open borders and the immigrant remittances that they 
make possible from a variety of objections.  In doing so I have not only shown those 
objections to be unpersuasive, but that they may indeed be more telling against a regime 
of less open borders that requires a greater emphasis upon foreign direct investment and 
foreign aid.  Of course, it is some considerable distance from offering epistemic reasons 
for extending the range of moral subjects who may benefit from more open borders in a 
way that may persuade Blake and Carens, to doing the same for Brock, Miller and 
Wellman.  Yet, our epistemic standpoint gives reason for those sceptical of more open 
borders to not only endorse them, but to do so in a manner consistent with what they have 
to say about the obligations of justice that may be owed to a) global strangers by 
wealthier nations and b) to the poor of poorer nations by their own governments.   
 It will be recalled that, along with Wellman (2008), Miller (1995) defends special 
obligations of justice to fellow nationals.31  This, however, should not be construed as a 
stance of no obligations towards global strangers and both Miller (1995, 73-80; 2007, 
163-200, 231-261; 2016a, 20-37) and Wellman (2008; 2011, 57-78) are clear that, whilst 
not the same as those owed to fellow nationals, obligations owed to global strangers do 
exist and the state has a duty to meet them. Brock (2009a: 190-210; 2009b; 2016: 9; 
Brock and Blake 2015: 24-35), too, accepts that rich states have such obligations.  The 
question therefore becomes how we are best able to identify and discharge these 
obligations for, as Carens insightfully points out in his discussion of the duties of rich 
                                                 
31 See also Carens (2016: 135-141) for a discussion of what richer states may do to 
combat brain-drain.   
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states, ‘there are lots of puzzles about the best way to eliminate poverty or promote 
economic development or reduce global inequalities’ (2016: 140).    
 It is useful in this connection to return to Brock’s (2009a: 206) objection that 
immigrant remittances are not spent effectively.  Whilst not needing to accept her account 
of the direct and indirect effects of remittances, we can take inspiration from its spirit and 
distinguish between spending on small and medium scale projects - such as 
microenterprises, small businesses and the construction of health clinics and schools - 
and large-scale projects such as water, transport and energy infrastructure.  As we have 
already seen in the case of the former, immigrant remittances are likely to play a 
constructive rôle because a significant proportion of them is devoted to healthcare, 
education and the setting up of new businesses, with the direct and indirect benefits that 
these imply.32  With respect to major infrastructure projects, however, Brock’s objection, 
and therefore the case for foreign aid under a less open borders regime, may be stronger.  
Indeed, one may venture that it is foreign aid rather than immigrant remittances that 
ought to be responsible in this case, precisely because senders will either not be 
concerned or, if they are, be in no economic position to provide major infrastructure.33   
                                                 
32 One study has estimated that almost one third of the capital invested in 
microenterprises within the ten Mexican states with the highest rate of migration to the 
United States is associated with remittances.  On this see Woodruff, C., and Zenteno, R. 
(2001).  See also Oberman (2015, 242) who cites studies that show that remittances are 
not spent just on day-to-day living. 
33 The foreign aid data confirm that resources for major infrastructure are transferred to 
those states that need them most rather than to those that may offer a healthy return.  See 
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 This notwithstanding, and as both the supporters and detractors of foreign aid 
suggest, one should be mindful of politics’ often disastrous track record in making 
decisions about major infrastructure.  Follies, bridges to nowhere and variants thereof are 
not the preserve of the rich and thoughtless.34  Furthermore, and as we have seen with 
respect to the sufficiency and allocation of resources to those left behind, it is here where 
more open borders serve an invaluable rôle in improving the performance of the state 
with respect to the global poor.  If we assume that the association of poverty and 
migratory outflows with the absence of major infrastructure is not coincidental, by 
tracking migrant and remittance flows wealthier states will be more likely to correctly 
identify the ends to which foreign aid ought to be put in the interests of justice.  In the 
case of major infrastructure this would be a demand-led process where regions and 
localities undergoing development stimulated by immigrant remittances - manifested in 
increased home building and improvement, the erection of new schools and clinics and 
the expansion of local trading centres - would be those most likely not to have the 
infrastructure in place to accommodate it.  But it is not just the decisions of wealthier 
states that stand to gain from more open borders.  Poorer states, too, could employ similar 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2013
+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc  
34 For a sceptical view of major infrastructure projects funded by foreign aid from a 
viewpoint that is broadly sympathetic to development aid see Banerjee, A., and Duflo, E. 
(2011).  For a sceptical view from a standpoint that is also sceptical of foreign aid see 
Easterly (2007).     
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geospatial predictive modelling techniques to ascertain to which ends the infrastructure 
aspects of their national development strategies may be best put.  
To be sure, and as the case of Mexico makes clear, there is not always a perfect 
correlation between emigration, remittances and poverty.35  Moreover, there is also a 
danger that by its very nature our epistemic standpoint may miss key indicators of 
deprivation and desperate need, most obviously where negligible emigration and 
remittance flows could indicate poverty so egregious as to make leaving prohibitively 
costly.  Yet, even in such cases state signalling has a rôle to play insofar as it may 
indicate negatively which regions require enhanced development measures.  Particularly 
in cases where this is because of even higher rates of poverty than those regions enjoying 
a migration/remittances dividend, the absence of such bottom-up signalling coupled with 
regional and sub-reginal development date alerts state actors to target resources to those 
places that run the risk of being overlooked.  
  Thus, more open borders not only aid us in identifying what these obligations are, 
but how they are most efficaciously discharged.  Rather, then, than have officers of the 
state decide such questions themselves, and in doing so run the risk of underspending 
relative to the needs of recipients, a more liberal stance toward migration is likely to be 
required in order for them to discharge the state’s obligations - to both its own citizens 
and to global strangers - that opponents of more open borders concede exist, whatever 
these turn out to be.  In this sense states could, as concerned actors, repurpose their 
migration policies as both barometers of needs and as one of the means to respond to 
                                                 
35 See footnote note 24 above.  
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them, rather than rely upon the epistemically distant determinations of those officers of 
the state who dispense foreign aid or pursue national development programmes. 
 
State based cash transfers and the problem of ex situ knowledge 
We noted at the beginning of this enquiry that Oberman provides an array of empirical 
evidence to suggest that immigrant remittances are an effective way to combat poverty, 
and we have endorsed this view by offering a set of conceptual reasons that explain why 
the empirical data is likely to turn out as he suggests.  Yet, despite this concurrence, 
Oberman ultimately distances himself from the stance defended here because of the 
deleterious effects of open borders on an important human right: the right to stay in one’s 
country of origin.  ‘[I]mmigration policy,’ he (Oberman, 2015: 249) claims, ‘should be 
regarded as a policy of last resort’ to address poverty precisely because it undermines the 
right to stay in one’s own country by presenting an exit option that individuals with a 
right to live tolerably decent lives in their own country should not have to choose.  I tis 
on the basis of this, therefore, that Oberman (2015: 248) suggests an alternative means of 
in situ poverty alleviation in the form of cash transfers from wealthier states would be 
preferable. 
 We will not be concerned with the veracity of Oberman’s claim about the 
existence of a right to stay in one’s country of origin, but our epistemic standpoint does 
provide other reasons to reject his view, even if we accept that such a right exists.  First, 
and given that the individual attachments and possibilities that play such an important 
rôle in generating the right to stay in Oberman’s (2015, 246-7) account are often local, it 
is not clear why he should not also be committed to the view that migration within states - 
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for instance across state or provincial boundaries, or from the countryside to cities - 
should be similarly restricted.  Beyond this, there are strong conceptual reasons to believe 
that state-based cash transfers from wealthier states to poorer individuals in poorer states 
would be likely to suffer from similar problems to non-immigrant remittances, as our 
metaphorical example of morally motivated Austrians highlighted earlier.  It is unclear, 
for instance, how state actors in a world of less open borders would decide competently, 
on the basis of their ex situ knowledge, who should be in receipt of cash transfers, how 
much they should receive and on what they should be spent.  Thus, whilst closer than 
foreign aid to the position defended here, it is unclear whether the result of a system of 
state-based cash transfers would be the kind of context-sensitive in situ processes that 
Oberman favours, rather than an ex situ one with all the drawbacks that we have 
suggested would be likely to arise.  Similarly, and to the degree that his last resort stance 
leads to a counterfactual state of affairs where fewer migrants gain entry than would 
otherwise have been the case, Oberman’s view leaves unanswered the problem of how 
poorer states may make good decisions about their own national development via the 
assistance of state signalling.  It may be the case, then, that ‘[s]tates violate the human 
right to stay if they fail to offer the global poor a means to achieve minimally decent life 
in their own country’ (Oberman, 2015: 240), but it is unclear how, to the extent that it 
discourages migration, Oberman’s view would assist them in doing so.  Thus, given the 
context-sensitive transformative effects of their operation, it remains the case that, pace 
Oberman, more open borders ought to be a policy of first rather than last resort, at least as 
far as the interests of those left behind are concerned.  
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 Contrary to the claims that the benefits of more open borders are at best negligible 
once brain-drain effects are factored in, they offer a uniquely beneficial way for 
government agencies to ascertain how their obligations of justice to global strangers are 
best discharged, insofar as remittance flows indicate in situ needs in a way that political 
decision-making structures may either miss, or distort.  It is not necessarily the case, then, 
that the positive benefits of more open borders are likely to be cancelled out by brain-
drain, for this net costs critique crucially overlooks their benefits.  Rather, we have strong 
reason to believe that the immigrant remittances that more open borders make possible 
are likely to be more stable and sufficient, more rational with respect to allocation, and 
induce beneficial ripple effects in the economies of poorer countries.  Moreover, the state 
signalling mechanism that more open borders also they make possible assists in the 
efficacious targeting of foreign aid and the effective delivery of national development 
programmes.36  Indeed, far from it being the case that more open borders will issue in a 
net loss for those left behind, we have strong conceptual reasons to claim that their net 
economic effects are likely to be positive for those left behind.   
 This final consequence of our defence of more open borders returns us to the 
stake that liberals have in defending their position in times of increased scepticism about 
immigration.  Precisely because our argument offers an account of the transformation of 
the economic conditions that motivate migration, the interests of those who desire lower 
levels of migration in the future, at least over the long-term are best served by loosening 
                                                 
36 See also Ypi (2008, 409).  Indeed, and regardless of the signalling mechanism they also 
make possible, in the specific case of Africa the value of remittances sent by skilled 
immigrants outweighs the cost of educating them (Easterly and Nyarko 2008).   
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entry restrictions in the present.37  Those concerned with the poverty of strangers, 
therefore, are not the only ones who should find the case for more open borders 
persuasive.  Those who for a variety of reasons are sceptical of immigration and wish to 
see it reduced now have at least one reason to endorse them as well. 
 To include the moral standing and interests of those left behind is both feasible 
and desirable for defenders of more open borders because doing so introduces a new set 
of arguments that strengthens their position.  Moreover, those sceptical of this viewpoint 
also have reason to endorse it.  As Carens (2016: 141) helpfully points out, there are at 
least some occasions when, despite the many puzzles that we may face -  as philosophers, 
activists, concerned citizens or officers of the state - what we are required to provide as a 
matter of justice can be known.  One of them is that all states provide more open borders.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In breaking with the dominant paradigm that focuses either upon either migrants or the 
already-resident, we have offered a new and distinctive defence of more open borders 
that considers those that migrants leave behind in their countries of origin.  The most 
obvious benefit of more open borders is that they make immigrant remittances possible 
                                                 
37 Of course, and as studies of the ‘migration hump’ have shown (Martin, 1994), it may 
be the case that development stimulated by remittances leads to a short- to medium-term 
increase in migratory pressure.  Yet, given that the migration hump refers to the 
transition from medium income to higher income status (where such pressures decrease),  
even if it is the medium-term result of more open borders, maintaining them despite this 
will mean that it is utlimately overcome more quickly.  
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which in turn are likely to address the in situ needs and interests of those left behind in 
ways that other methods of resource transfer cannot emulate in their absence.  Moreover, 
in advancing this case we have shown not only why expanding the range of subjects 
whose interests ought to be considered relevant to debate about justice and migration is a 
strategy that those who endorse more open borders ought to adopt because it augments 
and fortifies their own position.  We have also shown how those who are sceptical of 
more open borders are now required to offer an account that explains how, in the absence 
of more open borders, poverty may be as adequately addressed and obligations of justice 
to global strangers as effectively discharged as they would otherwise be, and even if these 
are less demanding than those owed to fellow nationals.   Finally, these considerations 
provide another set of reasons for those sceptical of immigration in wealthier migrant-
receiving countries to endorse them.  For, if the likely effects of more open borders are as 
I have suggested, then more open borders represent a means of reducing migratory 
pressure in the long-term by assisting migrant-sending countries to reduce poverty at 
home as speedily as possible.  
 There are doubtless numerous objections to the epistemic liberal view of 
migration justice.  One important one, that concedes much of the thrust of this economic 
case for more open borders, is that the benefits of immigrant remittances for those left 
behind represent little more than a sticking plaster on the deep structural wounds that are 
global poverty’s sources.  That is, proponents of more open borders and immigrant 
remittances fail to consider the question of how a sending society’s institutions are to be 
improved if citizens, particularly educated citizens, are incentivised to leave, thus making 
42 
 
 
it less likely that these countries will exit poverty.38  Such an objection, made by Brock 
(Brock and Blake 2015, 38-41; Brock 2016a; 2017: 157, n. 6) and Ypi (2008, 409), is 
worthy of a lengthy response.  It is, unfortunately, one that will have to be left until 
another occasion in a broader epistemic case for more open borders for those left 
behind.39  
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